Feb, 16, 2008 By Vikram Murarka 0 comments
Good to be with you again, Gentle Reader! This issue talks about:
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“RBI bars exotic forex products”. This headline in the Business Standard on 07-Feb-08 had the entire forex market in a tizzy. The report said that following losses of Rs 1000 Cr (about $253 mln) stemming from complex forex derivatives, the RBI has directed banks to sell only plain vanilla rupee-dollar derivative products for hedging corporate forex exposures, not for trading.
Although the ban has not been confirmed, the reactions to the headline have centered around whether or not the RBI has been justified in calling for a ban in the first place. Opinions have ranged from “Yes, it was justified” to “No, it wasn't” to “Don't know really.” Some voices, including ours, have called for greater education for the Buy side (Corporate sector) of the market.
So far, the discussions have focused on the derivative “products” - whether or not they should be banned; and whether there is a need for greater education regarding these “products”. Ironically, there has been no talk about the need to strengthen the very process of corporate FX risk management .
Of course, it is to be acknowledged that on the insistence of the RBI, many companies have adopted a Currency Risk Management policy at the board level. However, a policy is not the same as a process.
While a “policy” is more philosophical, outlining the overall guiding principles of an activity, a “process” is more practical, involving itself with the nuts-and-bolts issues of the day to day performance of the activity. And derivative “products” are something else altogether. They are merely the instruments used to implement the objectives of the hedging policy and process.
The global currency market has traditionally been driven by the “Sell Side” i.e. Banks. It is a testimony to the salesmanship of the Sell Side that the Buy Side has, quite often, been charmed into buying derivative products, without adequately evaluating their suitability. As in the case of any other product, while buying a derivative, it should be seen whether the product serves the overall objectives of the Customer.
Herein lies the need for a Hedging Process, as outlined below. Notice that “Which product to use” is only one out of the seven questions that a Hedging Process is intended to answer. As can be seen, the overarching emphasis on derivative products leads to a neglect of the other equally vital aspects of a complete hedging process.
Hedging Process is more practical in nature. It provides answers to the following questions:
How does one go about formulating a Hedging Process? We suggest a set of questions that every Corporate FX Risk Management Team can ask itself. The answers to these questions will pave the way for the formulation of a Hedging Process for the company.
Is it worthwhile taking the trouble to answer these 10 questions and formulating a 7-step Hedging Process? The results of the KSHITIJ Hedging Method, a complete, end-to-end hedging process, suggest it is.
Under the method, Exports have been covered at an average rate of 45.56 and 43.51 in 2006-07 and 2007-08 respectively, while Imports have been covered at averages of 45.20 and 40.70 in the same periods. Thus, a corporate having both Exports as well as Imports has been able to earn a hedged Export-Import margin of Rs 0.36/ USD, or 0.8%, in 2006-07. This margin increased dramatically to Rs 2.81/ USD, or 6.9%, in 2007-08.
The KSHITIJ Hedging Method, which is centered around a revolutionary concept of Dynamic Benchmarks has enabled both Exporters and Importers to make money simultaneously. Importantly, this has been achieved without resorting to speculation or trading, even while being hedged to the extent of 60%.
The secret in the KSHITIJ method is that it addresses all the aspects of a complete Hedging Process. Derivative products have certainly been used, but merely as instruments, as and when needed, to achieve the objectives of the Method. To reiterate, the focus needs to shift to the overall FX Risk Management objective, and not be confined to the derivative products.
Once a person starts taking care of his health, he will automatically cut down on cigarettes and junk food.
In our Oct-24 report (01-Oct-24, US10Yr @ 3.79%), we had said that in contrast with history, there were no immediate signs of a US recession and the earlier it could set in might be in Jan-Mar 2025, or maybe even later. We also favored just a slowdown, or at most a shallow recession. In accordance with this, the US data in October has been mixed to strong …. Read More
In our Oct-24 report (3-Oct-24, Brent $74.98), we had expected Brent to trade within $80-60 in the coming months. We had laid out a possibility of downside extension to $55-50 in case of a US recession in the Jan-Mar’25 quarter. Else a shallow recession or slowdown could limit the downside to $60. Brent remained above the Sep-24 low of $68.68 through Oct-24 trading within the broad $81.16-69.91 region, in line with our broader mentioned range of $80-60. … Read More
After Donald Trump’s victory in the US elections, will the Dollar Index fall in the coming months aiding Euro strength? Or will aggressive rate cuts by the ECB and political uncertainity in Germany and France continue to put downside pressure on the Euro? ……. Read More
Our November ’24 Monthly Dollar-Rupee Forecast is now available. To order a PAID copy, please click here and take a trial of our service.
Our November ’24 Dollar Rupee Monthly Forecast is now available. To order a PAID copy, please click here and take a trial of our service.